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remains only potential. Respect for these rights will encourage the
parolee's reciprocal trust and respect for the law, thereby
facilitating the state's interest in the achievement of rehabilitation.
Exactly where the delineation of procedures necessary to protect
the parolee's rights should be made remains a question of due
process, an ephemeral concept.78 The current trend toward
realization of fundamental rights through due process, however,
is permeating even those proceedings cloaked in administrative
cover; fortunately, the days of Martinez are numbered.
MICHAEL V. MILLS
TAXATION- FEDERAL INCOME TAX- EXCLUSION OF
SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS FROM GROSS INCOME
HELD NOT TO APPLY TO GRANTS FOR WHICH A SUBSTANTIAL
QUID PRO QUO WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE RECIPIENT. Bingler v.
Johnson (U.S. 1969).
The Westinghouse Electric Corporation, under a jointly
funded program with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
allowed certain employees educational leave of absence to pursue
formal education. Johnson' availed himself of this program and
studied, full time, for his doctoral degree. During the period he
was on leave he was paid a stipend by Westinghouse, which,
depending on certain factors, was 70 to 90 percent of the former
salary. Westinghouse treated these payments as indirect labor
costs and withheld federal income tax. Johnson retained all of his
employee benefits and seniority. Before commencing the
educational leave he was required to sign a contract agreeing to
return to the employ of Westinghouse. 2 In addition, Johnson was
required to make periodic progress reports to Westinghouse and
to submit his thesis topic to Westinghouse and the AEC for
approval.
Johnson brought suit claiming a refund of federal income
taxes withheld while he was attending school, contending that
78. See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwripht, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
I. The respondents consisted of Johnson and two co-workers who will hereinafter be
referred to as Johnson.
2. Respondent Wolfe did not sign a contract, but he was advised that he was expected




these payments were scholarships3 and excludable from gross
income. On appeal by the Commissioner to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed and the decision of the district
court reinstated; the payments were not excludable from gross
income as they were payments for services rendered. Bingler v.
Johnson, 89 S. Ct. 1439 (1969).
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, grants were
exempted from gross income if they met the tests of a gift.' In
1951 the Treasury promulgated a specific rule for the taxation of
grants which narrowed the definition of gifts as it pertained to
grants, although it was still necessary to show that no
consideration was given for the grant. The rule stated:
If a grant or fellowship award is made for the training and
education of an individual either as part of his program in
acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his educational
development, no services being rendered as consideration
therefor, the amount . . . is a gift which is excludable from
gross income.5
The mixture of gift and compensation in many of the cases'
resulted in decisions which varied from case-to-case depending on
which ingredient of the mixture surfaced as dominant. The
inconsistency created by this gift v. compensation test was aptly
demonstrated by the Tax Court just prior to the enactment of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code. In Ti Li Loo7 the grantee conducted
research in drugs at a university under a National Science
Foundation grant. The court held the grant includable in gross
income because the grantee's services were a valuable
consideration moving to the grantor.' Later the same year, the
Tax Court held the grant in George Winchester Stone9 was
3. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.117-3(a) and (c) (1956) respectively define a "scholarship" as an
amount paid to a student in pursuing his studies; and "fellowship" as an amount paid to
an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research. Hereinafter scholarships and
fellowships will be referred to as grants.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b)(3), 53 Stat. 47 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 102).
5. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 CUNO. BULL. 8, 10 (Emphasis added).
6. See Chommie, Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education, 58
DICK. L. REV. 93, 189, 291 (1954); Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income:
A Search for Treasury Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L. Q. 144; Note, Fellowship Grants Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 286 (1958-59).
7. 22 T.C. 220 (1954).
8. Id. at 225.
9. 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
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excludable from gross income although it appeared to involve as
much consideration as in Ti Li Loo. Stone received a grant from
a charitable foundation to do research in 18th Century English
drama. He was obligated to "engage in no other occupation"''
during the period of the grant and the grantor became obligated
to make installments of the grant only so long as the research
continued." The court reached its result by characterizing the
grant as a conditional gift.'2
Recognizing that the confused tax status of grants had
become a problem, Congress formulated section 117 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code. The legislative history of the section
reflects congressional intent: (1) to eliminate "existing confusion
as to whether such payments are to be treated as income or
gifts,"' 3 and thereby (2) to avoid a case-by-case determination of
that tax status. 4 In effectuating this goal, section 117 excludes all
grants and associated payments from gross income 5 of candidates
for degrees, 6 but specifically provides that any amount received
in payment for services which are required as a condition to
receiving the grant shall not fall within the exclusion. 7
10. Id. at 264.
II. Id. at 265.
12. Id. at 264.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954). 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD,
NEws 404 1.
14. Id.; see S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954). 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4648.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 117(a)states:
In the case of an individual, gross income does not include-
(I) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined
in section 151 (e)(4 ), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed
services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or fellowship grant, but only to the
extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
16. Non-degree candidates are treated separately. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § I 17(b)(2). This section was not at issue in Johnson.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 117(b)(1):
In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution [as defined in section 151(e)(4)], subsection (a) shall not apply to
that portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching.
[Vol. 7
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In 1956 the Treasury Department promulgated
regulation § 1.117. The regulation states that although "some
incidential benefit" accrues to the grantor, the exclusion will be
allowed when the "primary purpose" of the grant is to further the
training or education of the grantee in his individual capacity.18
Included in gross income by the regulation are grants which are
in the nature of compensation for past, present, or future services19
or grants which are for study or research primarily for the benefit
of the grantor."0
Under the Code and the regulation, the courts appear to have
shifted their emphasis from the gift v. compensation test to
discovery of the primary purpose of the grant where some benefit
accrues to the grantor. In extracting this primary purpose, the
courts have looked to the grantor. 21 Grantees generally had similar
purposes, i.e., reaching an immediate educational goal; but
research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as
a condition to receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant. If teaching,
research, or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not
recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a
condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other services
shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this
paragraph.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1 7-4(c)(2) (1956) disallows:
Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor. However,
amounts paid to or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts received as a
scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the primary
purpose of the studies or research is to further the education and training of
the recipient in his individual capacity and the amount provided by the grantor
for such purpose does not represent compensation or payment for the services
described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the
recipient is required to furnish reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the
fact that the results of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit
to the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character
of such amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1 7-4(c)(1) (1956). Included are:
Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarilY for the benefit of the
grantor.
(I) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid or
allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or
research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or
future employment or represents payment for services which are subject to the
direction or supervision of the grantor.
20. Id.
21. But see Chandler P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960); Rev. Rul. 60-378, 1960-2 Cun.
BULL. 38.
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grantors had vastly dissimilar purposes in awarding grants."
Thus, different results-again-were reached even though grantees
were in similar situations. 23 In the cases of Wrobleski v. Bingler, 2
Woddail v. Commissione2 5 and Ethel M. Bonn,26 each grantee
was a graduate physician. The grantor was a hospital where the
grantee was studying to obtain professional certification. Each of
the grantees was required to perform certain services for the
hospital as a condition of the grant. The grant. was held excludable
from gross income in Wrobleski, but not in Woddail and Bonn.
The distinguishing factor was that in Wrobleski the hospital was
a teaching hospital whereas in Woddail and Bonn the purpose of
the hospital was to treat patients. Thus, although the grantees
received the same training and performed similar duties, the
purpose of the hospital determined the tax status of the grants.
The disparity of results, in fact situations more closely
resembling Johnson, is again demonstrated in Usser', v. United
States,2 Stewart v. United States 8 and Aileen Evans.29 In each of
these cases the grant was from a state welfare department and the
grantee was required to work for the grantor upon the completion
of his education. The grant was held excludable from gross
income only in Evans. The distinguishing factor was that the
grantee in Evans had no prior employment relation with the
grantor, but in Ussery and Stewart the grantee was in the employ
of the grantor at the time of the grant.30 This was the generally
22. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 522, 1957-2 Cui. BULL. 50 (grant to theology students); Rev.
Rul. 50, 1957-1 CuI. BULL. 74 (grant to outstanding public servant). See also cases
collected in Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as lncomne: A Search fbr Treasury
Policy, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 144 n.2.
23. The difficulties in applying the primary purpose test were similar to those in the
gift v. compensation test. As stated by the Tax Court:
The primary purpose test requires a determination of the raison d'etre of the
payment-was it to further the education and training of the recipient or was
it, in reality, payment for services which directly benefited another person?
Often more than a single purpose is involved.
Elmer L. Reese, Jr., 45 T.C. 407 (1960), affd inein., 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1961).
24. 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
25. 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963).
26. 34 T.C. 64 (1960).
27. 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
28. 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966).
29. 34 T.C. 720 (1960), acquiesced in, 1965-1 CU M. BULL. 66.
30. In a situation analogus to the Ussery. Stewart and Evans cases, the Tax Court
held that although a portion of a grant was for compensation, the grant was nevertheless
excludable provided that the primary purpose of the grant was not to compensate the
[Vol. 7
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confused state of the law prior to Bingler v. Johnson. In a
situation where some benefit accrued to the grantor, it was
impossible to determine in advance whether a particular grant
would be taxable.
Johnson based his case for exclusion on two contentions.
Sections 117(b)(1) and (2)31 placed limitations on the type of
payments that could be excluded from gross income. Therefore,
he contended that by application of the cannon of construction
that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, 32 the
Treasury Regulation imposing further limitations was invalid. He
also contended that the Treasury Regulation was invalid because
it conflicted with the congressional intent to end the case-by-case
basis of determining taxability of grants. 3 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit agreed with the two contentions in extensive
dicta, but did not invalidate the regulation.34 Instead, the court
held that Johnson's situation was governed by the Evans35 case.31
The Supreme Court pointedly ignored the appelate court's
express ground of decision and addressed itself to the validity and
scope of the Treasury Regulation. The Court held that the
Treasury Regulation did not add additional limitations to section
117, but merely supplied the definitions of scholarships and
fellowships which were lacking in the Code but that were
necessary for its enforcement .3  The Court further stated: "We do
not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of
the tax laws. . . . In this area of limitless factual variations it is
grantee for services rendered. The government argued that if any portion of the grant was
compensation, the entire grant was taxable. William Wells, 40 T.C. 40 (1963), acquiesced
in 1965-1 Cuoi. BULL. 67. The Court in Johnson was informed that the Treasury
Regulation might be revised to conform to the Wells decision. 89 S.Ct. at 1449 n.32.
31. See notes 16 and 17, supra.
32. Expressio unius est exchtsio alterius. For the general operation of expressio Inius
on the tax laws see, I J. MERTENS. LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.17 at 30 (rev.
ed. 1962).
33. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1968), see text at note 13, supra.
34. The court stated: "To decide this issue, we do not have to consider the validity
Qf [Treasury Regulation § 1.1 17] in light of the statutory language and legislative history
of § 117." Id. at263.
35. The Court in Johnson was informed by the Solicitor General that the Evans
acquiescense would be modified. (Presumably to conform to the holding in Johnson.) 89
S.Ct. at 1448 n.30.
36. See Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1968), noted in 21 Ala. L.
Rev. 375 (1969).
37. 89 S.Ct. at 1444.
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the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts,
to make the appropriate adjustments."3
The Court then proceeded to do what they said they could
not do-make adjustments. In restating the Treasury Regulation,
the Court said: .'[S]cholarships' and 'fellowships' [are] relatively
disinterested, 'no strings' educational grants, with no requirement
of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipients." ' 31 In
substance, if not in form, this test for excludability of grants is a
return to the pre-1954 gift v. compensation rule. The language of
the Court is reminiscent of the dissent in the 1954 Stone" case
which was decided under that rule. There the dissenters stated:
"In short, the performance of the services or the doing of the
work . . . was a prerequisite or the quid pro quo for the money
received." 4'
The result of the Johnson decision is that there will still have
to be a case-by-case resolution of those grants which the
Commissioner desires to contest. And the test will be the same
whether it is called quid pro quo, primary purpose, or gift v.
compensation. For all practical purposes the problem has come
full circle and rests where it was prior to the 1954 Code.
One conclusion that may be drawn is that Congress is
satisfied with the way grants are being taxed. It has been sixteen
years since the Code was enacted and Congress has not moved to
reform section 117. It is especially worthy of note that the Tax
Reform Act of 196942 does not change section 117. However, it
is more probable that Congress has realized the difficulties of
devising a new test43 and has shifted its emphasis toward other
methods of aiding education through tax relief.
Evidence of a new concern44 for education is demonstrated by
the fact that ninety-two bills have been introduced in the 91st
Congress to aid education through tax relief. The bills provide
38. Id. at 1445, quoting from, United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299. 306-07 (1967).
39. Id.
40. 23 T.C. at 265.
41. Id.
42. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
43. No new," methods of determining taxability of grants have been suggested to date.
44. In 1968 there were over 7 million students in institutions of higher learning.
Educational expenses, which these students must bear directly, have more than doubled




three primary methods45 of aid to higher education through the
medium of tax relief: (1) Deductions for expenses of higher
education," (2) Full tax credit for expenses,47 and (3) Partial tax
credit." While none of the bills attempt to clarify the taxation of
grants, they indirectly resolve some of the problems caused by
section 117.
If any of the plans are enacted, the effect on recipients of
grants, such as in Johnson, would be twofold. First, the grantee
would not be faced with the situation of either paying no taxes if
the grant was held to be a nontaxable grant or paying taxes on
the total amount if the grant was held to involve a substantial
quid pro quo. No matter vhat restrictions were placed on the
grant, the grantee would receive a tax benefit based on that
amount actually expended on his education. Secondly, the grantee
would know in advance the various alternatives open to him. He
could weigh the relative ease of taking the tax benefit against the
possible time and expense of litigating to exclude the entire grant.
The deduction and full tax credit plans are subject to serious
drawbacks in that the relief is not uniform 9 or that it is too great
45. Four bills provide the following types of tax relief: H.R. 3705, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1969) (tax credit depending on number of family in college); H.R. 7576, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1969) (deduction if adjusted gross income is less than $7,500); H.R. 9062, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (deduction for'room rent); H.R. 11727, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)
(deduction of $1,800 per annum).46. S. 1098, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 5 H.R. 298, H.R. 306, H.R. 348,
H.R. 415, H.R. 541, H.R. 1301, H.R. 2109, H.R. 2110, H.R. 2164, H.R. 2392, H.R.
3245, H.R. 4137, H.R. 5261, H.R. 5512, H.R. 7582, H.R. 8167, H.R. 8274, H.R. 8276,
H.R. 8371, H.R. 8410, H.R. 9005, H.R. 9758, H.R. 10144, H.R. 10286, H.R. 10328,
H.R. 10389, H.R. 10626, H.R. 10691, H.R. 10828, H.R. 11115, H.R. 11139, H.R. 11185,
H.R. 11263, H.R. 11464, H.R. 11723, H.R. 12336, H.R. 12514, H.R. 13192, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1969).
47. H.R. 136, H.R. 176, H.R. 198, H.R. 318, H.R. 538, H.R. 540, H.R. 674, H.R.
939, H.R. 994, H.R. 1041, H.R. 1099, H.R. 1116, H.R. 1363, H.R. 2355, H.R. 3700,
H.R. 4169, H.R. 4176, H.R. 4235, H.R. 4826, H.R. 4859, H.R. 5249, H.R. 5813, H.R.
6002, H.R. 6289, H.R. 6511, H.R. 6819, H.R. 9054, H.R. 9069, H.R. 9568, H.R. 9691,
H.R. 9887, H.R. 9917, H.R. 10522, H.R. 10540, 4i.R. 10601, H.R. 10671, H.R. 11126,
H.R. 11844, H.R. 12269, H.R. 13213, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
48. H.R. 851, H.R. 979, H.R. 2137, H.R. 4151, H.R. 9094, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) (30% credit); S. 1258, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), H.R. 5499, H.R. 8758, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (20% credit).
49. The deduction plan would provide a benefit only if the taxpayer's total itemized
deductions (deductions from gross income) exceed the 10% standard deduction. Those
taxpayers who do not itemize deductions, but take the standard deduction would receive
no benefit. Such plans have been introduced in the past. For a detailed criticism, see 76
Harv. L. Rev. 368, 383 (1962).
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to be fiscally sound." The 30 percent partial tax credit plan
appears to be the most effective of those introduced because it
Would aid middle and low income taxpayers, but would not have
a substantial impact on the taxation of income not expended on
education."
Clearly a tax law which not only satisfies a pressing need for
aid to education, but also provides an important measure of
certainty in the taxation of grants is desirable. Such a law is
within the immediate grasp of Congress.
ALAN M. WINTERHALTER
50. Assuming an educational expense of $1000.00. the full tax credit plan would
operate as follows:
Taxpayer A B C
Taxable income $5,000 $10,000 $25,000
Effective tax rate (approximate) 19% 22% 34%
Gross tax 950 2,200 8,500
Example tax credit 1,000 1,000 1,000
Net tax 0 1,200 7,500
Net effective tax rate
as % of taxable income 0 12% 3.0%
Change in effective tax rate -19% -10% -04%
Thus the government would lose about 25 percent of its total revenue from these three
hypothetical taxpayers. with the number of students growing each year, the enactment of
such a plan might pose grave fiscal problems.
51. A 30 percent tax credit would, in effect, be an exclusion of that amount of income
expended on higher education if the taxpayer was taxed at an effective rate of 30 percent
(currently a taxdble income of about $16-18,000). Persons taxed at a rate below 30 percent
would find that the 30 percent tax credit would offset taxes on income expended for higher
education and carry over to a portion of income not expended on education, The lower
income taxpayer would not only receive a tax benefit on income expended on education,
but would receive a small benefit on his total income. The 30 percent plan would operate
as follows:
Taxpayer A B C
Taxable income $5,000 $10,000 $25,000
Effective tax rate (approximate) 19% 22% 34%
Gross tax 950 2,200 8,500
Example tax credit
(30% of $1,000) 300 300 30C
Net tax 650 1,900 8,20C
Change in effective rate -6% -3% -1%
